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Summary
The far right is on the rise in many western and eastern European countries.
The 2008 Eurozone crisis is an obvious source of blame for this phenomenon;
indeed, a large body of literature suggests that economic malaise prompts
support for far right parties. This conventional wisdom, however, is not
consistent with cross-national patterns of unemployment and far right votes
in the last three European Parliament (EP) elections. To solve this puzzle, we
argue that it is specific labour market policies rather than the economic crisis
itself that are more likely to facilitate the rise of the far right. In many countries
over the past three decades, governments have deregulated employment
protection legislation (EPL) and reduced unemployment benefits; but it was
precisely these labour market institutions that offered protection from the
insecurity and deprivation that economic malaise imposes on societies. We test
our hypothesis on the last three EP elections and find that unemployment and
GDP growth have not played a role in far right support, while labour market
institutions have had an impact that is both direct and indirect, by limiting the
effect of unemployment. Studying unemployment benefits also revealed a
similar phenomenon of direct and indirect correlation: where unemployment
benefits are generous, unemployment has no association with the far right, but
where they are not, unemployment correlates with higher far right support.
Employment protection legislation has only an indirect association that is
conditional on unemployment benefits. Where unemployment benefits are
low, EPL mediates the impact of unemployment, but where unemployment
benefits are generous, there is no mediating impact of EPL. This suggests that
the policies of austerity are likely to intensify support for the far right in EP
elections, therefore undermining the European integration project itself. 
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1. Introduction
Since the onset of the 2008 Eurozone crisis, the far right has made significant
gains across Europe. Given the conventional wisdom on the link between
economic malaise and support for the far right, many see this political
development as a clear and direct consequence of the economic crisis. As
unemployment rises, growth stalls and wages stagnate or fall – so the argument
goes – many voters become dissatisfied with the mainstream and turn to the
far right. 
The results of the recent 2014 European Parliament elections, which saw
tremendous gains for the far right, are often regarded as confirmation of this
argument. But while appealing, this conventional wisdom is not consistent with
the patterns of far right support and unemployment that have developed since
2000. As Figure 1 shows, there is no clear positive relationship between the
unemployment rate prior to an election and the share of votes that far right
parties get. Thus, for instance, while Spain has the second highest rate of
unemployment among the EU-28, it did not experience a rise in far right party
support, with both Spain 2000 and National Democracy (DN) remaining
marginalised. In Portugal too, the National Renovator Party (PNR) experienced
no rise in its electoral performance despite the country’s economic malaise.
Other countries meanwhile, such as the UK and Denmark, did experience a
rise in far right party support despite having lower unemployment rates. 
This is because, we argue, it is not the crisis itself that facilitates the rise of the
far right but rather the policy context prior to its development and the crisis
policy responses that were consequently adopted by governments across
Europe.1 More specifically, labour market institutions have been weakened in
the last two decades and, by pursuing austerity, governments have worsened
the situation. This is problematic because it is precisely these institutions that
were meant to protect broad swaths of the population from the vagaries of the
market, including economic crises. In particular, employment protection
legislation (EPL), which had already been deregulated in many European
countries prior to the crisis, was reduced even further. This has resulted in
higher levels of insecurity among the employed. The economic impact on those
who lose their job has also been intensified by the simultaneous cuts made to
unemployment benefits prior to the crisis. 
This working paper unfolds as follows: we first examine the differences be -
tween the radical and extreme variants of the far right and discuss the literature
Why far right parties do well at times of crisis: the role of labour market institutions
5WP 2016.07
1. See Halikiopoulou and Vlandas (2015) for a thorough test of this argument.
on the determinants of far right support. We use the last three EP elections to
test these determinants and show that there is little evidence to support many
of the factors highlighted by this literature. Next, we show how the welfare state
literature gives rise to the expectation that labour market institutions play a
key role in mitigating the impact of unemployment on insecurity. Results from
regression analyses of the last three EP elections suggest that unemployment
benefits directly reduce - and limit the impact of unemployment on - far right
support. While EPL does not have a direct effect on far right support, it does
mediate the extent to which unemployment has an effect on far right voting
patterns; however, this mediating effect can only be identified where
unemployment benefit schemes are not generous. The last section concludes.
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Figure 1 Unemployment rate and far right support in both western and eastern
Europe in the last three EP elections
Note: each point represents the far right vote and unemployment rate for a given country in an election.
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2. The extreme and radical variants of
the far right and EP elections
In this paper we adopt the umbrella term ‘far right’ to denote political parties
on the fringes of the system that share an anti-immigrant agenda premised on
nationalism, i.e. the need to protect the nation and its identity from outsiders.
We distinguish between extreme and radical variants. This distinction captures
differences within the far right party family relating to their relationship with
fascism and democracy, as well as the extent to which these parties pursue their
agendas through the adoption of violence. Extreme variants reject democracy
altogether and tend to emphasise fascist and/or Nazi ideals in their manifestos.
They often adopt violence. Radical variants, on the other hand, accept
procedural democracy, reject the fascist label and put forward an agenda that
emphasises ideological as opposed to a racial opposition to immigration. These
parties justify exclusion not on the basis of ethnic or racial background but on
the basis of ideological intolerance and incompatibility with ‘our’ democracy
(Halikiopoulou et al 2013). 
Using the term ‘far right’ allows us to capture both the similarities and
differences within this party family. On the one hand, grouping political parties
into ‘party families’ is a common way of classifying them (Mair and Mudde
1998) for the purposes of operationalization and comparison. Parties that
belong to the same party family are assumed to be comparable groups, and a
comparison of parties within a party family and/or between party families is
assumed to wield generalizable conclusions. On the other hand, precisely
because of the heterogeneity of this party family, we need to be careful in
accounting for differences in terms of voting base, association with fascism,
opposition to the EU, the degree to which these parties accept procedural and
substantive democracy and the use of explicit racism in their manifestos. The
presence of ‘borderline’ cases also poses difficulties by often blurring the
distinction between far right parties and those on the fringes of the
mainstream. By using the term ‘far right’, we cover a range of parties that we
categorise as comparable but not necessarily identical in terms of their
ideology, their origins and their organisational structures. We use this term to
designate all parties that claim ownership of the immigration issue, which they
justify on the basis of nationalism (Eatwell 2000; Hainsworth 2008;
Halikiopoulou et al. 2012), despite differing from each other in terms of their
relationship with democracy, the extent to which they have a fascist past and
the extent to which violence forms part of their agenda (Halikiopoulou and
Vlandas 2015). These criteria inform their classification within the ‘extreme’
and ‘radical’ sub-categories. Overall we identify 36 ‘far right’ parties in 28 EU
member states (see Appendix 1) and have coded their national electoral results
in European Parliament (EP) elections.
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EP elections are second-order ‘national contests’ (Hix and Marsh 2007). They
are fought in the shadow of first-order contests and are used to influence the
result of the next national election. For this reason, EP elections tend to give
citizens an opportunity to vote for parties that are closer to their ideal
preferences. Voters treat EP elections as mid-term contests in the battle to win
national government office and they use them primarily to punish governing
parties (Hix and Marsh 2007). 
As such, EP election results provide a good platform for testing the impact of
the economy on far right party support at the national level across Europe.
They offer a ‘snapshot’ of 28 different elections with results at a particular point
in time, using a comparatively similar electoral rule. EP elections also provide
a good reference point for understanding the rise of both radical right variants,
which have been the most popular types of far right parties since the 1990s,
and the more extreme variants that have experienced a rise in support more
recently, such as the Hungarian Jobbik and the Greek Golden Dawn. Finally,
EP elections provide a platform on which to test a model of far right party
support across both western and eastern Europe, which are rarely examined
together. 
The last three EP elections have seen an overall rising trend of far right parties
across Europe; Figures 2 and 3 show the evolution of the far right in western
and eastern Europe respectively. This phenomenon is neither necessarily linear
nor generalizable across the EU. For example, in countries such as Spain,
Portugal and Cyprus, support for the far right has been consistently low. In
France, the Front National (FN) experienced a decline in support in 2009 but
made a significant recovery in 2014. In Bulgaria and Italy, far right support
declined in 2014. However, in many cases the trend has been an upward one,
with a significant rise in countries such as Greece, Denmark, Sweden, Finland
and the UK.
Tim Vlandas and Daphne Halikiopoulou
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Figure 2 Far right votes in the last three EP elections in western Europe
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Figure 3 Far right votes in the last three EP elections in eastern Europe
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3. The economic determinants
of far right party support
3.1 Theoretical expectations
How can we understand the rise of the far right in Europe? A large body of
literature focuses on the link between far right party support and economic
distress. The premise is that economic crises tend to create societies of winners
and losers, thus facilitating conditions favourable to right-wing extremism
(Mudde 2010). Far right parties are the most prominent beneficiaries of
financial crises because they capitalise on the heightened economic uncertainty
through a blame-shifting rhetoric that excludes outsiders from the nation; at
times when resources appear to be scarce, these parties seek to restrict access
to the collective goods of the state (see for example Golder 2003; Cochrane and
Nevitte 2014). Scholars point out that the rise of the far right has historically
coincided with economic crisis, a principal example being the rise of fascism
and Nazism during the interwar period (Lipset 1960).
Empirically, however, this does not seem to apply as a general rule. First of all,
the findings are conflicted: different conclusions drawn in various studies, both
within and across cases, have prompted scholars to note that demand-side
economic factors in themselves may be poor predictors of far right party
support (Mudde 2010; Lucassen and Lubbers 2012) and that cultural factors
may be more important. Lucassen and Lubbers (2012), for example, argue that
perceived ‘cultural ethnic’ threats appear to be a stronger predictor of far right
preferences than perceived ‘economic ethnic’ threats. Second, far right party
support does not directly correlate with unemployment; there is no strong
correlation suggested between cross-national variation in the unemployment
rate and far right party support. However, a bivariate correlation alone does
not present a sufficient test of the link between unemployment and far right
support. In the next section we devise a more systematic empirical test using
time series cross-section regression analysis. 
3.2 Empirical analysis
We have collected data on several national-level variables that allow us to test
the determinants of far right support that have been identified in previous
literature (as discussed above). Where data is available, all independent
variables are for the year before the election takes place. This is because all
elections take place in May, which means it makes more sense to test, for
example, the effect of unemployment for the year before rather than for the
current year. In some cases, data is not available for 2013 and we therefore
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have to rely on 2012 data (or in a very few cases on 2011 data) but this is never
the case for fast-moving economic variables. Descriptive statistics, definitions
and sources of all variables are discussed in Table A2 in the appendix.
We rely on the overall unemployment rate (as % of total) firstly because it
captures the biggest problem in the labour market, but also because it receives
the most attention from the public. However, we also test whether using the
change instead of the level of unemployment yields different results. We
include a number of controls for demand-side factors, the first set of controls
being real GDP growth. We also test for the effect of budgetary stress (debt and
deficit as % of GDP). A second control concerns the impact of deindustri -
alisation, which has received some attention in the literature on far right
politics (e.g. Kitschelt 2007). The third set of controls concerns the role of
internationalisation, which previous literature has also focused on. Kriesi
(2014), for example, argues that the populist right is more likely to mobilise in
defence of the nation-state and national identity, concepts that interna -
tionalisation may undermine. Following Lucassen and Lubbers’ (2012)
argument about perceived 'cultural ethnic threats', any international forces
that threaten the state (e.g. globalisation) or national identity (e.g.
immigration) could be expected to correspond with higher far right support.
We include two measures to test these expectations: first, we include total trade
(sum of exports and imports) as a share of GDP and second, we investigate
whether immigration affects far right support.
To account for supply-side dynamics, we consider the role of several factors.
First, to gain an idea of the extent to which national electoral systems allow for
the representation of far right votes in national elections, we rely on whether
there is a proportional representation (PR) electoral system in the country. We
expect PR systems to exhibit lower far right support in EP elections because
dissatisfied voters can voice their discontent in national elections. Second, we
consider the extent to which the party system is open by including an index of
electoral fractionalisation.2 Finally, considering the variations between eastern
and western Europe (Mudde 2007; Halikiopoulou et al 2012), we capture
whether countries have a communist past by including a dummy variable:
coded 1 where the condition is present and 0 where it is not.
As our focus is on EP elections, it is important to control for EU-level dynamics.
First, participation in the European elections varies enormously by country. It
is therefore important to control for voter turnout in the EP elections as a
percentage of the total of eligible voters. Second, literature on Euroscepticism
shows that attitudes towards European integration affect voting preferences
in EP elections (Hix and Marsh 2007). We therefore control for the percentage
of people who answered ‘a good thing’ to the question: ‘Generally speaking, do
you think that (OUR COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU is…?’
Tim Vlandas and Daphne Halikiopoulou
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2. Index of legislative fractionalisation of the party system according to the formula [F]
proposed by Rae (1968).
Our regressions report robust standard errors clustered by country, since
autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity are likely to be present. Because we are
interested in explaining variation across countries, the inclusion of country
fixed effects would ‘explain away’ what we are trying to demonstrate. Indeed,
as Plümper, Troeger and Manow (2005: 331) argue, ‘unit dummies completely
absorb differences in the level of independent variables across units’. Thus the
‘level effect’ of our key independent variables (e.g. unemployment benefits) is
therefore suppressed when including country fixed effects (ibid: 333). Another
problem with including fixed effects is that it would further reduce the degrees
of freedom: including country dummies removes about half of the degrees of
freedom from the model, thereby inflating standard errors.3
Figure 4 shows the results for our baseline model. Note that all independent
variables are standardised around mean 0 with standard deviation of 1 which
means the coefficients are directly comparable: they show the effect on far right
support of a 1 standard deviation change in the independent variable.4 The
unemployment rate has no statistically significant effect in all models, further
corroborating the absence of correlation discussed earlier. Real GDP growth
Why far right parties do well at times of crisis: the role of labour market institutions
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3. We thank an anonymous reviewer for making this point.
4. Full results can be found in Table A4 in the appendix.
Figure 4 Results from regression analysis of far right party support in the last three
EP elections
Note: 90% confidence interval. Both dependent and independent variables have been standardised with mean
0 and standard deviation of 1. Thus, plotted coefficients show the effect of 1 standard deviation change in the
independent variable on the dependent variable (except for the proportional representation dummy and post-
communist dummy that take values 0 or 1). Constant not shown. Full results can be found in Table A4 in the
appendix.
Unemployment
Real GDP
Electoral fractionalization
Immigration
Total trade
Industrialisation
postcommunist
Proportional representation
-2 -1 0 1 2
Baseline
Adding globalisation and industrialisation
Adding post-communist and PR dummies
and total trade are similarly statistically insignificant. The only two variables
that are statistically significant are electoral fractionalisation, which increases
far right support (only in baseline specification), and the proportional
representation dummy which has a negative association with far right support.
However, electoral fractionalisation is only statistically significant in the first
models. In Figure 5 we rerun the same regression but substitute levels in
unemploymentwith change in unemployment. The results are the same. Next,
we introduce controls for EP voter turnout and support for Europe, which are
not significant; only the proportional representation dummy is statistically
significant (see Figure 6).
Tim Vlandas and Daphne Halikiopoulou
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Figure 5 Results from regression analysis of far right party support in the last three
EP elections, replacing ‘level’ with ‘change’ in unemployment
Note: 90% confidence interval. Both dependent and independent variables have been standardised with mean
0 and standard deviation of 1. Thus, plotted coefficients show the effect of 1 standard deviation change in the
independent variable on the dependent variable (except for the proportional representation dummy and post-
communist dummy that take values 0 or 1). Constant not shown. Full results can be found in Table A4 in the
appendix.
Change in Unemployment
Real GDP
Electoral fractionalization
Immigration
Total trade
Industrialisation
postcommunist
Proportional representation
-2 -1 0 1 2
Change instead of level of unemployment
Adding globalisation and industrialisation
Adding post-communist and PR dummies
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Figure 6 Results from regression analysis of far right party support in the last three
EP elections, adding controls for EU level dynamics
Note: 90% confidence interval. Both dependent and independent variables have been standardised with mean
0 and standard deviation of 1. Thus, plotted coefficients show the effect of 1 standard deviation change in the
independent variable on the dependent variable (except for the proportional representation dummy and post-
communist dummy that take values 0 or 1). Constant not shown. Full results can be found in Table A4 in the
appendix.
Unemployment
Real GDP
Immigration
Electoral fractionalization
Total trade
Industrialisation
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Proportional representation
Voter Turnout in EP Elections
support for Europe
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4. Bringing labour market institutions
back into the debate on right-wing
extremism
4.1 What matters is not the economy per se but the
mediating eﬀect of speciﬁc policies
So far we have shown that economic distress in itself is not significant; but what
if we test more specifically the effect of the risks and costs of unem ployment?
We argue that the relationship between economic distress and far right party
support is in fact a complex one and conditional on labour market institutions.
In this section we test the extent to which policies that mediate the effect of
unemployment have an impact on far right party support. We start by
distinguishing the effect of unemployment on two different groups in the labour
market: ‘outsiders’ (those who are unemployed or have precarious employment
contracts) and ‘insiders’ (those who have permanent full-time contracts)
(Emmenegger et al. 2012). Unemployment affects both the outsiders and the
insiders (cf. Rueda, 2007). This is because while unemployment imposes a cost
on those that are unemployed and no longer have an income, it also increases
the subjective and objective insecurity of employed workers who may become
more fearful of losing their job. In other words, unemployment may increase
insecurity and hence lead to higher levels of far right support through two
conceptually distinct channels: because it imposes costs on the unemployed
and because it increases the risks for those that are employed. This distinction
between employed insiders and unemployed outsiders is politically and
economically salient because the last decades have been characterised by an
increased labour market dualisation in which the risks, entitlements and policy
preferences of these two groups diverged (Emmenegger et al. 2012).
Unemployment has been found to impact on various dimensions of welfare,
such as well-being, life satisfaction, or other metrics (e.g. Jahoda 1988; Gerlach
and Stephan 1996). In addition, workers that were previously unemployed
continue to feel insecure even after returning to work (Böckerman 2004;
Erlinghagen 2008). This in turn will affect their political preferences. For
instance, previous literature has shown that those without a job or in
precarious employment have differing policy preferences from those who
currently have a permanent job (Rueda 2005; Rueda 2007; Emmenegger 2012;
Vlandas 2013; Marx and Picot 2013; Marx 2014). 
The effect of unemployment on outsiders and insiders is crucially mediated by
labour market institutions. Clearly, workers who become unemployed suffer a
loss of income; but the size of that loss depends on labour market institutions
because in most European countries the unemployed are eligible to receive
unemployment benefits that replace some of their previous income (Van Vliet
Tim Vlandas and Daphne Halikiopoulou
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and Caminada 2012). As a result, the cost of being unemployed depends on the
generosity of the unemployment benefit scheme: in countries with generous
benefits, the cost of unemployment relative to employment is lower than in
countries where unemployment benefit replacement rates are low. In a recent
analysis using the European Social Survey, Chung and van Oorschot (2011)
confirm that generous unemployment benefits provide a sense of security by
partly replacing lost income.5
Table 1 shows that unemployment benefits have become less generous in many
countries.6 Among the countries that have cut unemployment benefits between
2003 and 2009 the reductions range from -0.02% in Germany to -27.1% in
Poland, -31.0% in Latvia and -36.4% in Romania. Others have increased the
generosity of their benefits in this period. Note that since many countries have
retrenched their benefits since 2009 and have at the same time experienced
massive increases in far right party support (e.g. Greece), using 2009 as a proxy
for 2013 if anything ‘stacks the cards’ against our argument. 
Unemployment and labour market institutions also influence insiders’ fear of
being dismissed. Outsiders are only one labour market group that is adversely
affected by rising unemployment; insiders in permanent employment may also
be negatively affected when assessing the resulting higher risk that they will
become unemployed and hence suffer a loss of income. While the real or
perceived risk is most obviously determined by unemployment, it is also
influenced by employment protection legislation (EPL): where EPL is high,
dismissal regulations are stringent and an employer is (all other things being
equal) less willing to dismiss an employee when economic activity falls, because
the cost of firing the employee is higher. Consistent with this expectation,
workers with permanent contracts that are protected by EPL exhibit different
degrees of insecurity and different policy preferences from those with
temporary contracts that are not protected (Clark and Postel Vinay 2005;
Rueda 2007; Vlandas 2013). 
Consequently, our expectation is that where EPL is high, permanent workers
fear unemployment less because they are unlikely to be made redundant. This
is confirmed by Mau, Mewes and Schöneck (2012: 17), who find a ‘significant
interaction between the unemployment rate and the employment protection
index … indicating that unemployment may indeed go along with higher
insecurity, but only under conditions of relatively weak labour market
regulation.’ Where it is easier to dismiss them, permanent workers will
therefore respond more fearfully to a rise in unemployment (for more on the
effect of EPL on permanent workers, see Rueda 2005 and 2007; Emmenegger
et al 2012; Vlandas 2013). 
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5. Note that this also seems to occur with welfare state spending in general: ‘those living in
countries with higher levels of welfare state spending are considerably less concerned about
their future socio-economic standing than individuals living in countries with lower welfare
state effort’ (Mau, Mewes and Schöneck 2012: 17).
6. Unfortunately the latest data available for this dataset is 2009, which we therefore use as
our last data point for unemployment benefits.
While we expect high levels of unemployment to only correspond with higher
levels of far right party support in countries with low EPL, our expectations
concerning the direct effect of EPL itself on far right party support is more
uncertain. This is because the literature on labour economics shows that EPL
not only reduces flows into unemployment but also decreases the likelihood of
finding a job for the unemployed (OECD 1994; Bassanini and Duval 2006,
2009). In principle, therefore, it is not clear which of the two effects dominate,
and the two may well cancel each other out. Indeed, the evidence concerning
the impact of EPL on unemployment is mixed (eg Baccaro and Rei 2007). The
average effect of EPL is therefore uncertain: if the effect on workers dominates,
unemployment should have a negative effect on far right support; if the effect
on the unemployed dominates, the reverse should be true; and if both effects
are equivalent, the association should be statistically insignificant.
As shown in Table 2, many governments in Europe have deregulated EPL in
the last two decades. Between 2003 and 2013, almost all countries for which
there is data deregulated EPL for regular workers, including Greece, the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Portugal, Slovakia and Spain. However, a few countries,
such as Germany and Ireland, in fact strengthened their EPL. In 2013, the top
five countries with the highest index were Portugal, the Netherlands, Latvia,
Slovenia and Germany. The UK and Ireland were among the countries with the
lowest EPL indices.
4.2 Empirical analysis
We test the impact of labour market institutions that may mediate the effect of
unemployment on far right support. We rely on the index of EPL for regular
workers developed by the OECD. The higher the EPL index, the less likely
workers on permanent contracts will fear losing their job in the face of
increasing unemployment. To capture cost, we rely on the unemployment
benefit replacement rate, which captures the size of income loss upon becoming
unemployed.
The results are shown in Figure 7. The coefficient for unemployment benefits
is statistically significant and negative, suggesting that more generous
unemployment benefits are associated with lower far right support, while the
coefficient for EPL is not statistically significant. Unemployment remains non-
significant but immigration is now positive (in some specifications that do not
control for EU-level dynamics) and significant while electoral fractionalisation
has no effect. The coefficient for real GDP growth is negative and significant
but is not stable across specifications. Similarly, the coefficient for indus -
trialisation is negative and significant only in one specification.
In Table A5 (appendix), we exclude certain outliers and rerun the results. First,
we exclude Poland (column 2), which is an outlier in terms of the level of far
right support, and find that the results are unchanged. Second, we exclude
Spain, which is an outlier in terms of unemployment, and again find that the
results are unchanged (column 3). Third, we exclude all countries where far
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right support is 0 because these countries might be characterised by the
absence of far right parties (column 4). We find that the coefficient for electoral
fractionalisation is positive and significant, as in some previous specifications.
However, there are some noteworthy differences. First, the effects of
immigration and being a post-communist country are now positive and
significant, while the effect of industrialisation is negative and significant. The
coefficient for proportional representation is no longer statistically significant.
In Figures 8 and 9, we run the same regression but this time we allow for
interaction effects between unemployment, EPL and unemployment benefits.
We find no support for a mediating impact of EPL. As expected, unemployment
benefits mediate the impact of unemployment on the far right: in countries
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Table 1 Net unemployment replacement rate for an average worker in 2003, 2008 and 2009
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Lithuania
Latvia
Luxembourg
Malta
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Spain
Slovak Republic
Slovenia
Sweden
United Kingdom
2003
0.65
0.57
0.64
0.74
0.50
0.65
0.50
0.65
0.70
0.71
0.36
0.44
0.47
0.61
0.42
0.69
0.88
0.43
0.75
0.35
0.77
0.79
0.69
0.55
0.68
0.67
0.46
2008
0.64
0.56
0.52
0.50
0.63
0.49
0.60
0.70
0.71
0.42
0.43
0.55
0.73
0.49
0.48
0.90
0.43
0.72
0.26
0.76
0.48
0.68
0.58
0.64
0.55
0.39
2009
0.63
0.56
0.56
0.52
0.64
0.51
0.60
0.70
0.71
0.42
0.42
0.59
0.73
0.49
0.48
0.89
0.42
0.71
0.26
0.75
0.50
0.68
0.57
0.64
0.53
0.41
Percentage change between 2003 and 2009
Note: Net unemployment replacement rate for an average worker, one earner couple with two children. Source: Olaf Van Vliet & Koen Caminada
(2012), ‘Unemployment replacement rates dataset among 34 welfare states 1971-2009: An update, extension and modification of Scruggs’ Welfare
State Entitlements Data Set’, NEUJOBS Special Report No. 2, Leiden University. Note that the years 2003, 2008 and 2009 are used for EP elections
in 2004, 2009 and 2014, respectively. We use the year preceding the EP elections but are constrained by the latest data point available which is for
2009, and which we therefore use as a proxy for 2013. Data for the year 1995 is provided to give a sense of the long-term evolution of generosity.
Negative changes
-3.0%
-1.2%
-12.5%
n.a.
-2.3%
-8.6%
-0.020%
-5.1%
-31.0%
-3.0%
-5.5%
-27.1%
-2.2%
-36.4%
-1.3%
-5.5%
-21.9%
-11.6%
Positive changes
4.5%
0.8%
0.3%
18.0%
24.1%
19.2%
17.3%
1.2%
3.8%
where the unemployment benefit system is not generous, higher unemploy -
ment is associated with higher far right support; but where unemployment
benefits are generous, there is no statistically significant association between
unemployment and far right support. In Figure 10, we show the results of a
model that also includes an interaction term between unemployment benefits
with the change (rather than the level) of unemployment and find a similar
mediating effect. Of note is that more than 10% of observations have
unemployment benefit replacement rates of 0.4 or less (see histogram in
appendix). As shown in Table 1, only five EU countries have unemployment
benefit replacement rates inferior to 0.4.
Finally, we wish to investigate whether the mediating effect of EPL is itself
contingent on unemployment benefit systems. This is shown in Figure 11,
which reveals that EPL only mediates the impact of unemployment on far right
support in cases where benefits are not generous. For instance, where the
unemployment benefit replacement rate is 30%, unemployment is associated
with higher support only when EPL is lower than 2.5 (more than 20% of
observations have an EPL of 2 or less). The combination of EPL below 2.5 and
unemployment benefit of 30% or less seems to be based only on one country
(Poland) and the extent to which this finding can be generalised may therefore
be limited.
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Table 2 OECD index of employment protection legislation for regular workers
Country
Austria
Belgium
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Ireland
Italy
Latvia
Luxemburg
Netherlands
Poland
Portugal
Slovakia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
UK
2003
2.62075
2.7568
2.96825
2.56066
n.a.
2.08333
2.72732
2.94898
2.92971
2.39569
1.81179
3.15136
n.a.
n.a.
2.9178
2.55726
4.09524
2.78968
n.a.
2.7551
2.57653
1.67744
2008
2.62075
2.7568
2.78685
2.34637
2.45862
2.0119
2.72732
3.08503
2.92971
2.39569
1.90703
3.15136
n.a.
2.71145
2.9178
2.4144
3.69048
2.65873
2.85771
2.7551
2.57653
1.67744
2013
2.62075
2.7568
2.69615
2.39172
2.11395
2.0119
2.6678
3.08503
2.44218
2.1695
1.99773
2.86565
2.99036
2.71145
2.92602
2.4144
2.81037
2.27948
2.8237
2.35544
2.57653
1.55839
Note: The OECD indicators of employment protection legislation measure the procedures and costs involved in dismissing individuals or groups of
workers.
Percentage change between 2008 and 2013
0.0%
0.0%
-9.2%
-6.6%
n.a.
-3.4%
-2.2%
4.6%
-16.6%
-9.4%
10.3%
-9.1%
n.a.
n.a.
0.3%
-5.6%
-31.4%
-18.3%
n.a.
-14.5%
0.0%
-7.1%
While this represents a test at the macro level, there is also evidence at the
micro level that is based on survey data and corroborates our argument that
labour market institutions have a crucial impact on far right votes. A study by
Arzheimer (2009), for example, supports our claim that unemployment
benefits have both a mediating and direct effect on far right support. He
investigates cross-national variation in western Europe before eastern
enlargement, combining system-level variables with individual sociodemo -
graphic and attitudinal data in the period between 1980 and 2002 and
including in the analysis cases where the far right performed poorly. His results
show a statistically significant effect of unemployment benefits in reducing far
right party support, although he suggests that this effect is not particularly
strong overall (ibid: 271). His findings concerning the interaction between
unemployment benefit systems and unemployment rates are also consistent
with our argument. Specifically, he finds that ‘a positive effect [of unemploy -
ment rates] becomes visible but only in contexts when either levels of
immigration or benefits are very low’ and that ‘at high levels of immigration,
unemployment benefits reduce the impact of unemployment’ (ibid: 272). 
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Figure 7 Results from regression analysis of far right party support in the last three
EP elections, adding labour market institutions
Note: 90% confidence interval. Both dependent and independent variables have been standardised with mean 
0 and standard deviation of 1. Thus plotted coefficients show the effect of 1 standard deviation change in the
independent variable on the dependent variable (except for the proportional representation dummy and post-
communist dummy that take values 0 or 1). Constant not shown. Full results can be found in Table A4 in the
appendix.
Unemployment
Real GDP
Immigration
Electoral
EPL
Unemployment benefits
Total trade
Industrialisation
postcommunist
Proportional
Voter turnout in EP
Support for Europe
-2 -1 0 1 2 3
Controlling for labour market institutions
Adding globalisation and industrialisation
Adding post-communist and PR dummies
Controlling for EU level dynamics
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Figure 8 Plotting how the interaction between unemployment and EPL correlates
with far right party support in the last three EP elections
Note: Full results can be found in Table A4 in the appendix.
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Figure 9 Plotting how the interaction between unemployment and unemployment
benefits correlates with far right party support in the last three EP
elections
Note: Full results can be found in Table A4 in the appendix.
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Figure 10 Plotting how the interaction between the change in unemployment and
unemployment benefits correlates with far right party support in the last
three EP elections
Note that more than 10% of observations are 0.4 or less. Full results can be found in Table A4 in the appendix.
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Figure 11 Plotting how the interaction between unemployment, unemployment
benefits and EPL correlates with far right party support in the last three EP
elections
Note that roughly 20% of observations have an EPL index range from 1.5 to 2 – see histogram in the 
appendix. Note: Full results can be found in Table A4 in the appendix.
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5. Conclusion
Does economic distress facilitate right-wing extremism and, if so, how may we
understand the different patterns of far right party support across Europe?
While many theories focus on the effect of the economy itself, there are
conflicting expectations and contradictory findings concerning this approach.
Indeed, the cross-national variation in unemployment rates and far right
support in recent EP elections is not prima facie consistent with a direct impact
of unemployment on the far right. When they do coincide, the causal
mechanism linking economic malaise and far right party support is unclear. 
To address this issue, this paper has reconceptualised the effect of
unemployment on far right support. Our theoretical framework centres on the
mediating effect of labour market institutions, focusing in particular on EPL
and unemployment benefits. In this way, we specify the causal mechanism that
links economic distress to far right party support at times of crisis: where
labour market institutions offer greater protection from the risks and costs of
unemployment, the far right is less likely to fare well electorally. Where, on the
other hand, these institutions are less generous, the risks and costs of
unemployment are greater and the far right is more likely to increase its
support. 
We tested our argument on the last three EP elections and found that
unemployment and GDP growth per se are not statistically significant.
Unemployment benefits have both a direct association with far right support
and an indirect association through limiting the effect of unemployment: where
unemployment benefits are generous, unemployment has no association with
far right support, but where they are not, unemployment correlates with higher
support for the far right. EPL only has an indirect association conditional on
unemployment benefits: where unemployment benefits are low, EPL mediates
the impact of unemployment; but where unemployment benefits are generous,
there is no mediating impact of EPL.
The aim of this paper was to identify certain broad associations, which can then
be examined in greater detail in further research. We have relied on statistical
methods to explore these associations. Our findings are consistent with the
patterns observed in certain country case studies, such as the UK, where the
far right has experienced increased support as a result of low EPL and
unemployment benefits, or Portugal, where both labour market institutions
have remained protective and the far right has not attracted any significant
support. At the same time, these methods are limited in their ability to explain
all single country cases. This is because individual case study dynamics may
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reinforce or break patterns identified in our analysis; in Spain, for instance,
the history of authoritarianism is an important political dynamic that hinders
the success of far right parties (see for example Alonso and Kaltwasser 2015).
Despite these limitations, our results have wider implications. They suggest
that the rise of the far right is not merely the result of exogenous forces that
are outside of policy makers’ control. On the contrary, it is more likely the
outcome of labour market policy choices. In a number of European countries,
governments of both the left and right have reduced entitlements to
unemployment benefits and have deregulated job security regulations. As a
result, the unemployed have seen their standard of living deteriorate, while a
growing segment of the labour force now works on temporary contracts and
workers on permanent contracts feel increasingly insecure. The most affected
economies have responded to the financial crisis by pursuing policies of
austerity (Theodoropoulou and Watt 2011), further exacerbating economic
uncertainty. The irony is that it is precisely these policies, targeted at solving
Europe’s economic predicament, that have intensified political instability in
many European countries. If we are right, the adoption of these policies
increases the risks and costs of unemployment, which, in turn, makes the rise
of the far right more likely. Social democratic parties and the union movement
should continue to oppose austerity not only because of its adverse economic
effects, but also because of its dangerous political consequences in times of
crisis. 
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Appendix 1 Sources for coding of far right wing parties
Country
Austria 
Austria
Belgium 
Bulgaria 
Croatia 
Cyprus 
Czech Republic
Denmark 
Estonia 
Finland 
France 
Germany 
Germany 
Greece
Greece 
Greece 
Hungary 
Ireland 
Italy (LN)
Latvia 
Lithuania 
Luxemburg
Malta 
Netherlands 
Netherlands
Poland 
Poland
Poland 
Portugal 
Romania 
Slovakia 
Slovakia
Slovenia 
Spain 
Sweden 
UK 
UK
Far right wing party
Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ)
Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ)
Flemish Interest (VB)
National Union Attack (ATAKA)
Croatian Party of Rights (HSP)
National Popular Front (ELAM)
Workers’ Party of Social Justice (DSSS)
Danish People’s Party (DF)
Estonian Independence Party (EIP)
True Finns (PS)
National Front (FN)
National Democratic Party of Germany (NPD)
The Republicans (REP)
Golden Dawn (GD)
Popular Orthodox Rally (LAOS)
Independent Greeks (ANEL)
Movement for a better Hungary (Jobbik)
N/A
Northern League (LN)
National Alliance (NA)
Order and Justice party (TT)
National Movement (NB)
Imperium Europa (IE)
Party for Freedom (PVV)
List Pim Fortuyn (LPF)
Law and Justice Party (Pis)
Congress of the New Right (KPN)
League of Polish Families (LPR)
National Renovator Party (PNR)
Greater Romanian Party (PRM)
Slovak National Party (SNS)
People’s Party-Our Slovakia (L’SNS)
Slovenian National Party (SNS)
National Democracy (DN)
Sweden Democrats (SD)
British National Party (BNP)
United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP)
Sources
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Katsourides (2013)
Mares ̌ (2012) 
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou (2015) 
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Vasilopoulou and Halikiopoulou (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Vasilopoulou (2011)
Rydgren (2013) 
Lubbers et al. (2002) 
Minkenberg and Perrineau (2007); Falzon and Micallef (2012) 
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Harrison and Bruter (2011)
Pankowski (2010); Harrison and Bruter (2011); Pankowski and
Kormak (2013) 
Harrison and Bruter (2011)
Harrison and Bruter (2011); Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Pytlas (2013) 
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Ellwood (1995)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
Immerzeel et al. (2015)
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Table A2 Descriptive statistics for variables used
Variable
Far right votes
Unemployment benefit replacement rate
Unemployment rate
Parliamentary fragmentation
Proportional representation dummy
EPL index
Real GDP growth
Post-communist dummy
Trade as % of GDP
Share of industrial employment
Immigration as % of recipient country’s
population
Euroscepticism 
EP election turnout
Change in unemployment
(5)
Maximum
value
38.93
0.900
27.50
10.07
1
4.095
8.600
1
371.4
40.20
0.038
85
91.22
17.9
(4)
Minimum
value
0
0.260
3.100
2.024
0
1.558
-5.400
0
0
12.40
0
27
13.05
-12
(3)
Standard
deviation
8.812
0.137
4.525
1.706
0.264
0.448
2.710
0.482
65.86
6.027
0.007
13.49822
19.05
3.96
(2)
Mean
7.305
0.583
8.737
4.784
0.926
2.607
1.517
0.357
113.8
27.10
0.008
53.21
45.66
-0.25
(1)
Observations
80
79
84
81
81
61
83
84
84
83
84
69
80
84
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Variable
% vote for far right
parties
Unemployment rate
Real GDP
Post-communist
dummy
Unemployment
benefits
Electoral
frationalisation
Proportional
representation dummy
Total trade
(% of GDP)
Industry
Employment
Protection Index
Total Immigration
Effective number of
parties
EP turnout
Support for the EU
Description
% vote for far right parties. For our classiﬁcation see Appendix
2. Years used for each country: 2004, 2009 and 2014.
Unemployment rates represent unemployed persons as a
percentage of the labour force. Years used for each country:
2003, 2008 and 2013.
Real GDP growth rate – volume. Percentage change on previous
year. Years used for each country: 2003, 2008 and 2013.
Equals 1 for 12 countries that joined the EU in 2004 and 2007
enlargements (excluding Cyprus and Malta)
Net unemployment replacement rate for an average worker, one
earner couple with two children. The dataset scales the
replacement rate between 0 and 1 (i.e. 0.75 means that that
75% of the income prior to unemployment is replaced by
unemployment beneﬁts). Years used for each country: 2003,
2008 and 2011.
Index of electoral fractionalization of the party system
according to the formula [F] proposed by Rae (1968). Years
used for each country: 2003, 2008 and 2011.
Proportional Representation? (1 if yes, 0 if no): “1” if candidates
are elected based on the percent of votes received by their party
and/or if our sources speciﬁcally call the system “proportional
representation”. “0” otherwise. Years used for each country:
2003, 2008 and 2011.
Sum of Export and Import of Goods and Services, % of GDP.
Years used for each country: 2003, 2008 and 2013.
Industry employment as % of Total Employment
The OECD indicators of employment protection legislation
measure the procedures and costs involved in dismissing
individuals or groups of workers. Strictness of employment
protection – individual and collective dismissals (regular
contracts). Years used for each country: 2003, 2008 and 2013.
In percentages. Years used for each country: 2003, 2008 and
2012.
Eﬀective number of parties on the votes level according to the
formula [N2] pro-posed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979). Years
used for each country: 2003, 2008 and 2011.
Voter turnout in the EP Elections as a percentage of the total of
eligible voters
Percentage of people who answered ‘a good thing’ to the
question: ‘Generally speaking, do you think that (OUR
COUNTRY)'s membership of the EU is…?’ 
Sources
For far right results: EU Election Database
http://eed.nsd.uib.no/webview/index.jsp?study=h
ttp://129.177.90.166:80/obj/fStudy/ATEP2004
_Display&node=0&mode=cube&v=2&cube=http:/
/129.177.90.166:80/obj/fCube/ATEP2004_Disp
lay_C1&top=yes
and http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections
2014-results/en/election-results-2014.html 
Eurostat
Eurostat
Author’s calculation
Van Vliet and Caminada (2012)
Armingeon et al. (2013)
DPI2012 (2012) 
Eurostat
European Commission
OECD database accessible at:
http://www.oecd.org/els/emp/oecdindicatorsofe
mploymentprotection.htm 
Eurostat
Armingeon et al. (2013)
The data for EP turnout are accessed at:
http://www.nsd.uib.no/european_election_databa
se/election_types/ep_elections/ and
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/elections2014-
results/en/turnout.html 
This data was extracted from the following three
Eurobarometer reports: 79.5, 69, 59.
Table A3 Definitions and sources for variables for European elections sample
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Table A4 Full results for figures 4 to 11
Column
Results for figure
Unemployment rate
Real GDP growth
Electoral fragmentation
Immigration
Trade openness
Industrialisation
Post-communist dummy
Proportional representation
Change unemployment rate
Voter turnout EP elections
Euroscepticism
Constant
Observations
Number of countries
R-squared within model
R-squared overall model
R-squared between model
(9)
6
0.05
(0.105)
-0.03
(0.083)
0.27t
(0.159)
0.17
(0.141)
-0.25
(0.188)
-0.22
(0.183)
1.02
(0.771)
-1.52*
(0.606)
0.06
(0.149)
0.13
(0.133)
1.18t
(0.634)
67
26
0.29
0.19
0.16
(8)
6
-0.03
(0.092)
-0.07
(0.067)
0.22
(0.142)
0.09
(0.117)
-0.14
(0.190)
-0.22
(0.169)
0.79
(0.709)
-1.38**
(0.513)
0.04
(0.144)
1.07t
(0.546)
75
26
0.13
0.20
0.23
(7)
6
-0.03
(0.091)
-0.07
(0.065)
0.22
(0.142)
0.09
(0.122)
-0.14
(0.183)
-0.23
(0.168)
0.74
(0.688)
-1.34**
(0.508)
1.05*
(0.535)
75
26
0.12
0.21
0.23
(6)
5
-0.08
(0.066)
0.22
(0.140)
0.10
(0.122)
-0.14
(0.179)
-0.21
(0.142)
0.72
(0.642)
-1.36**
(0.508)
-0.02
(0.073)
1.08*
(0.525)
75
26
0.13
0.20
0.23
(5)
5
-0.04
(0.038)
0.23t
(0.128)
0.03
(0.108)
-0.14
(0.153)
-0.20
(0.124)
-0.01
(0.071)
0.02
(0.178)
78
27
0.11
0.06
0.06
(4)
5
-0.04
(0.042)
0.27*
(0.131)
0.05
(0.098)
0.03
(0.061)
0.01
(0.185)
78
27
0.14
0.00
0.00
(3)
4
-0.03
(0.091)
-0.07
(0.065)
0.22
(0.142)
0.09
(0.122)
-0.14
(0.183)
-0.23
(0.168)
0.74
(0.688)
-1.34**
(0.508)
1.05*
(0.535)
75
26
0.12
0.21
0.23
(2)
4
-0.01
(0.087)
-0.04
(0.040)
0.22t
(0.129)
0.02
(0.114)
-0.14
(0.150)
-0.20
(0.135)
0.02
(0.177)
78
27
0.10
0.06
0.06
(1)
4
0.05
(0.067)
-0.04
(0.040)
0.26t
(0.133)
0.06
(0.100)
0.01
(0.186)
78
27
0.15
0.00
0.00
Note: robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1.
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Table A4 Full results for figures 4 to 11 (continued)
Column
Results for figure
Unemployment rate
Real GDP growth
Electoral fragmentation
Immigration
Trade openness
Industrialisation
Post-communist dummy
Proportional representation
EPL
Unemployment benefits
Constant
Observations
Number of id
R-squared within model
R-squared overall model
R-squared between model
(10)
7
0.04
(0.077)
-0.14
(0.098)
0.28t
(0.165)
0.25*
(0.106)
-0.08
(0.163)
-0.64**
(0.213)
0.05
(0.201)
61
22
0.31
0.19
0.14
(11)
7
-0.04
(0.074)
-0.13
(0.095)
0.29
(0.178)
0.28*
(0.120)
-0.24
(0.208)
-0.32*
(0.144)
-0.03
(0.172)
-0.69**
(0.240)
0.03
(0.185)
61
22
0.30
0.32
0.30
(12)
7
-0.04
(0.098)
-0.21*
(0.095)
0.32t
(0.182)
0.29t
(0.165)
-0.14
(0.340)
-0.25
(0.239)
0.26
(0.974)
-1.14**
(0.350)
0.05
(0.143)
-0.71**
(0.226)
1.02*
(0.428)
59
21
0.32
0.41
0.39
Note: robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1. Note
that the EPL index has lower country coverage and therefore the number of countries in the analysis drops when
including the EPL index.
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Table A4 Full results for figures 4 to 11 (continued)
Column
Results for figure
Real GDP growth
Electoral fragmentation
Immigration
Post-communist dummy
Proportional representation dummy
Trade openness 
Industrialisation
EP voter turnout
Euroscepticism
Unemployment rate
Change in unemployment rate
EPL
Unemployment benefits
Unemployment*EPL
Unemployment*unemployment benefits
Change in unemployment rate*unemployment benefits
EPL*unemployment benefits
Unemployment* EPL*unemployment benefits
Constant
Observations
Number of id
R-squared within model
R-squared overall model
R-squared between model
(13)
8
-0.59
(0.384)
0.36
(0.228)
357.87
(269.395)
7.40
(9.649)
-9.22**
(2.808)
-0.05
(0.040)
-0.42
(0.386)
0.02
(0.114)
0.05
(0.109)
0.75
(1.596)
2.26
(4.720)
-36.22*
(14.672)
-0.35
(0.648)
16.01
(18.854)
55
21
0.34
0.44
0.42
(14)
9
-0.09
(0.285)
0.39*
(0.152)
227.90
(187.753)
-0.82
(5.589)
-9.75***
(2.944)
-0.02
(0.020)
-0.26
(0.236)
-0.04
(0.077)
0.04
(0.082)
0.98t
(0.578)
-29.69*
(13.004)
-1.63
(1.044)
11.86
(12.330)
65
25
0.34
0.39
0.41
(15)
10
-0.05
(0.325)
0.38*
(0.159)
218.01
(185.006)
0.37
(5.582)
-9.47***
(2.865)
-0.02
(0.021)
-0.32
(0.220)
-0.04
(0.075)
0.07
(0.085)
0.84*
(0.393)
-41.79***
(12.678)
-1.40
(0.997)
19.69
(13.315)
65
25
0.37
0.37
0.37
(16)
11
-0.15
(0.292)
0.44*
(0.200)
305.06
(245.380)
6.45
(7.878)
-7.58**
(2.921)
-0.05
(0.036)
-0.53t
(0.316)
.09
(0.131)
0.05
(0.103)
22.02**
(8.410)
49.33*
(23.790)
148.93*
(71.769)
-8.88*
(3.496)
-34.90**
(12.370)
-76.00*
(32.971)
13.93**
(5.139)
-102.76t
(57.060)
55
21
0.36
0.51
0.54
Note: robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1. Note that the EPL index has lower
country coverage and therefore the number of countries in the analysis drops when including the EPL index.
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Note: robust standard errors clustered by country in parentheses; *** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05, t p<0.1
Table A5 Robustness to change in sample
Column 
Change
Unemployment rate
Real GDP growth
Electoral fractionalisation
Immigration as % 
EPL
Unemployment benefits
Total trade
Industrialisation
Post-communist
Proportional representation
Voter turnout in EP elections
Support for Europe
Constant
Observations
Number of id
R-squared within model
R-squared overall model
R-squared between model
(4)
Excluding countries with
0 support for far right
-0.02
(0.136)
-0.04
(0.157)
0.55*
(0.261)
0.40t
(0.239)
0.10
(0.214)
-0.50*
(0.236)
-0.61
(0.535)
-0.64**
(0.215)
1.95t
(1.002)
-0.66
(0.531)
-0.02
(0.261)
-0.10
(0.222)
0.41
(0.609)
45
18
0.41
0.55
0.59
(3)
Excluding
Spain
-0.00
(0.106)
-0.18
(0.133)
0.31
(0.232)
0.28
(0.240)
-0.02
(0.203)
-0.53*
(0.232)
-0.40
(0.312)
-0.30
(0.261)
0.84
(1.108)
-1.02**
(0.342)
0.02
(0.245)
0.11
(0.192)
0.84*
(0.385)
52
20
0.36
0.41
0.39
(2)
Excluding
Poland
-0.12
(0.114)
-0.20
(0.125)
0.24
(0.214)
0.08
(0.219)
-0.06
(0.174)
-0.31*
(0.142)
-0.25
(0.246)
-0.22
(0.208)
0.47
(0.812)
-1.05**
(0.374)
0.14
(0.195)
-0.02
(0.184)
0.84*
(0.379)
53
20
0.26
0.44
0.46
(1)
No change
-0.06
(0.097)
-0.19
(0.126)
0.33
(0.212)
0.29
(0.232)
-0.01
(0.193)
-0.56*
(0.222)
-0.39
(0.305)
-0.30
(0.258)
0.86
(1.088)
-1.04**
(0.330)
0.02
(0.235)
0.09
(0.174)
0.83*
(0.370)
55
21
0.35
0.44
0.41
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Figure A1 Histogram of employment protection legislation
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Figure A2 Histogram of unemployment benefits
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Note: as noted earlier, this data covers three data points - 2003, 2008 and 2009 - because 2009 is the latest 
year for which data is available.
